Ideas from 'Pref to new 'Materialist Theory'' by David M. Armstrong [1992], by Theme Structure

[found in 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' by Armstrong,D.M. [Routledge 1993,0-415-10031-3]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas

---

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities

7440	Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness

7437	Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same

17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism

7434	Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour

17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour

7436	The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism

7429	Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism

7438	A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind

7431	The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability

7432	One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types